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INSIDE THE MIND OF THE REASONABLE PERSON: DETERMINING
WHEN DISCOVERY OF LOSS HAS OCCURRED UNDER A FIDELITY
BOND IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Fraud is a continual problem for many businesses.1 Its effects can be
devastating, as it represents a principal factor in the unexpected collapse
of corporations and the failure of banks.2 Yet the primary actors in this
fraud arena are not rogue outsiders; they are employees. 3 According to
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, the dishonest tactics of em-
ployees account for over $400 billion in annual losses to their employers. 4
Despite the obvious problem employee infidelity presents, businesses are
generally ill prepared to detect and defend against internal fraud.5 In-
deed, many accept employee dishonesty as an inevitable cost of doing
business. 6
1. See Daniel Hays, Loss Control Lags on Fraud Risk, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Aug.
7, 2000, at 3 (stating that employee fraud and dishonesty is persistent threat for
many employers); see a/soJohn C. Eichman, Submission of the Insured's Claim, in HAN-
DLING FIDELITY BOND CLAIMS 53, 53 (Michael Keeley & Timothy M. Sukel eds.,
1999) ("Nearly every type of organization in America-both profit and non-
profit-finds itself victimized from time to time by the dishonesty of one of its
employees.").
2. See Mark Ballamy, Risk Management of Management Risks, ACCOUNTANCY AGE,
Feb. 24, 2000, at 28 (explaining that although unexpected corporate collapse has
many causes, fraud is primary cause). Employee fraud affects not only corpora-
tions, but also financial institutions. See Allen N. David & Mauren Mulligan, Intent
Is Key to Loan Recovery, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 22 (discussing employee fraud in
financial institution setting). Although they are not covered by fidelity bonds,
losses from loans are occurring at a high rate and have prompted many banks to
investigate the conduct of bank officers that issue loans. See id. (stating "[3oan
losses are the single greatest cause of loss to banks and bank failures," and their
increased frequency has caused banks to begin investigating conduct of loan
officers).
3. See Ballamy, supra note 2, at 28 (noting that survey shows directors and
other senior managers are actively involved in most corporate fraud cases).
4. See Heather Williams, Crime Doesn't Pay, But Crime Insurance Does, at http://
www.insure.com/business/crimeinsurance.html (Mar. 23, 2000) (offering fraud
statistics). In a recent survey of 5000 companies, corporate fraud losses of
$1,000,000 constituted twenty-one percent of all reported fraud-related losses, up
from eighteen percent in 1994. See Pamela Sebastian, Business Bulletin: A Special
Background Report on Trends in Industry and Finance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at Al
(noting increased number of large corporate fraud loses).
5. See Hays, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that many businesses fail to ade-
quately guard against risk of employee dishonesty).
6. See ArthurJ. Bourque, II, Stop, Thief, NAT'L PUB. ACCOUNTANT, Sept. 1995,
at 32 (stating that just as manufacturers accept some defects in their product lines,
businesses often accept fraud as cost of operations); As Recent Cases Illustrate, Denial
Doesn't Halt Fraud, PREVENTING BUs. FRAUD, Aug. 1999, at 2 ("Some [internal audi-
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Though employers may be unable to prevent employee fraud com-
pletely, for many years they have been able to purchase insurance poli-
cies-called fidelity bonds-that cover losses caused by, among other
things, dishonest or fraudulent acts of employees. 7 A common condition
for coverage on these agreements is that in order for a loss to fall under
the bond, the insured must discover it during the bond period.8 Once the
insured has discovered the loss or facts indicating the loss, the insured
must give timely notice to the insurer.9 This timely notice satisfies a con-
tractual condition leading to the insurer's duty to investigate the loss.
10
tors] actually accept employee fraud as a given and corporate fraud as the cost of
doing business.").
7. See Edward G. Gallagher et al., A Brief History of the Financial Institution Bond,
in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS 3, 3 (Duncan L. Clore ed., 2d ed. 1998)
(stating that roots of fidelity bonds date back to days of Babylonians). A bond is
defined as "an insurance agreement pledging surety for financial loss caused to
another by the act or default of a third person or by some contingency over which
the third person may have no control." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrION-
ARY (2001), available at http://www.m-w.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) (defining
"bond"). A fidelity bond serves to protect the insured from financial loss caused by
the failure of integrity, fidelity or honesty of the insured's employees or others
owing a fiduciary duty to the insured. See 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' AP-
PLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 1.32 (2d ed. 1999) (defining "fidelity bond").
The typical standard form fidelity bond is composed of several sections. See
Andy Wilson, Recoveringfrom Dishonesty, SEC. MGMT., Mar. 1, 1999, at 57 (discussing
five components of typical fidelity bond). First, the "declarations" section provides
information on the insured, the coverage period, the aggregate and limits of liabil-
ity, and physical locations covered by the bond. See id. Second, the "insuring
agreements" section defines the bond's indemnification coverage. See id. Third,
the section entitled "general agreements" sets forth certain administrative under-
standings between the insurer and insured, such as what will happen to coverage
in the event the insured is involved in a merger or a consolidation. See id. Fourth,
the "conditions and limitations" section details which events or sequences must
occur before coverage begins and also which events or sequences will terminate
coverage. See id. This section also defines terms used throughout the bond, such
as "employee" and "discovery." See id. Finally, the "riders and endorsements" sec-
tion serves to cater the bond to a particular insured by adding or deleting certain
coverage from the standard policy. See id.
8. See 11 B JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
LAw & PRACIICE § 6979 (1997) (explaining that to recover loss under fidelity
bond, insured must show that it discovered loss during coverage period).
9. See Robert M. Horkovich et al., Insurance Coverage for Employee Theft Losses: A
Policyholder Primer on Commonly Litigated Issues, 29 U. MEM. L. R Lv. 363, 366 (1999)
(stating that most standard form fidelity bonds require insured to give notice to
insurer upon discovery of loss).
10. See Duncan L. Clore & Michael Keeley, Discovery of Loss: The Contractual
Predicate to the Claim, in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 149,
149 ("Compliance with the notice and proof of loss requirements... put[s] the
claim process in motion, allowing the insurer the opportunity to begin its investiga-
tion, attempt to mitigate any loss, and if appropriate, establish reserves.").
Once the insured submits its notice of loss and supporting documents, the
insurer will begin its investigation in order to discover facts that may be missing
from the insured's report. See Duncan L. Clore & John Tomaine, Discovery of Loss,
in HANDLING FIDELITY BOND CLAIMS, supra note 1, at 385, 402 (discussing purpose
of insurer's investigation). The insurer will typically look at several sources from
[Vol. 46: p. 801
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Though untimely loss is a viable affirmative defense to coverage as a
breach of condition, many jurisdictions now require the insurer to show
not only that notice was untimely, but also that it has caused the insurer to
suffer prejudice.' I
Before the notice issue can be analyzed, the point at which the in-
sured can be charged with discovery of loss must be determined-an issue
that frequently sparks litigation between the insured and the insurer.1 2
The test for discovery of loss in the standard form fidelity bond requires
the insured to give notice to the insurer when the insured is aware of facts
that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that a loss has occurred
or will occur. 13 This test is primarily objective, and several United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts have dutifully
applied its clear language in cases involving issues of loss discovery.' 4
which to glean these facts: (1) interviews of the insured's present and former em-
ployees and officers who either were involved in the transaction or took part in the
insured's investigation; (2) information from the meetings with the insured or its
attorneys; (3) the insured's financial records and books; and (4) information from
external sources, such as the reports of auditors and regulatory agencies. See id.
11. See David T. DiBiase, Loss, Notice, Proof in THE COMMERCIAL BLANKETr BOND
ANNOTATED 105, 105 (William F. Haug ed., 1985) (discussing traditional and mod-
ern reading of notice requirement); Allen N. David & George C. Rockas, Late No-
tice of Losses Is Key Issue, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 19, 1990, at 17 (stating that insurer must
demonstrate prejudice before denying coverage because of late notice). Tradi-
tionally, courts construed the notice requirement as a condition precedent to re-
covery under the bond and placed the initial burden of proof on the insured to
prove notice was timely. See DiBiase, supra, at 105 (noting traditional construction
of notice requirement).
12. See Clore & Tomaine, supra note 10, at 385 ("[T]he issue of when [a] loss
was first 'discovered' is undoubtedly the most litigated, and debated, issue faced in
fidelity claims."); Paul R. Devin & Allen N. David, Discovery Under Fidelity Bonds: The
Emerging Concept of the Insured's Duty of Inquiry, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 543, 544 (1986)
(noting that issue of discovery is frequently litigated).
13. See FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND, STANDARD FORM No. 24 (revised 1986),
reprinted in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 449, 453 [herein-
after "STANDARD FORM No. 24"] (providing primarily objective standard for deter-
mining discovery of loss). Fidelity bonds are usually just one part of
comprehensive insurance policies employers may purchase. See Horkovich et al.,
supra note 9, at 365 n.4. In addition to employee dishonesty, these policies typi-
cally cover losses resulting from on-premises burglary, forgery or alteration, false
securities, counterfeit currency and computer crime. See id.
14. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 205 F.3d 615, 627
(3d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter "City Savings"] (applying primarily objective test to as-
certain time of discovery under standard form financial institution bond); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oldenberg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that
reasonable person standard is proper to determine point of discovery under stan-
dard form fidelity bond); First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
2 F.3d 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit
Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11029, at *10 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 1999) ("As revealed by
the express terms of the Bond, the definition and determination of when discovery
occurs is measured under an objective reasonable person standard."); Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Underwriters of Lloyd's of London, 3 F. Supp. 2d 120, 147 (D. Mass.
1998) (applying reasonable person standard to determine point of discovery under
standard form bond); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Moskowitz, 946 F. Supp. 322, 332
2001]
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Other courts, however, have construed the standard as an exclusively sub-
jective one, requiring that the insured realize that it has or will suffer a
loss. 15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
considered the issue of discovery of loss in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co.,16 which is known in fidelity law as the City Savings case.17 In
City Savings, the Third Circuit interpreted the discovery test of the stan-
dard form bond, concluding, after a survey of case law from the Third
Circuit and other circuit case law, that a plain meaning application of the
standard was appropriate.' 8 The Third Circuit's reading of the standard
was unlike that of several other circuits because it applied the full stan-
dard, not merely its subjective component.' 9 This reading puts insureds
within the Third Circuit's jurisdiction on notice that a court may find dis-
(D.N.J. 1996) (stating that discovery occurs when reasonable person would con-
clude from facts available to insured that loss has or will occur); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 928 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Mass. 1996) (same); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Moskowitz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15259, at *14 (D.N.J. Aug. 31,
1994) ("Discovery is deemed to occur when the insured actually becomes aware of
sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable person to charge another with fraud
or dishonesty."); Fountainebleau Cmty. Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3880, at *12-13 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 1994) (recognizing that standard form
bond features discovery provision based on objective standard); First Nat'l Bank v.
Lustig, 150 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. La. 1993) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), afj'd in
part, vacated in part, 942 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 785 F. Supp. 867, 868 (D. Mont. 1990) ("The bond
clearly provides for an objective rather than a subjective test ....").
15. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 974
(5th Cir. 1995) (applying subjective standard to determine point of discovery
under ambiguous discovery provision); Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav.
Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1991) (employing subjective standard to de-
termine point of loss under fidelity bond featuring primarily objective discovery
standard); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1079
(6th Cir. 1990) (applying subjective standard where bond provision expressly sets
forth primarily objective standard).
16. 205 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2000).
17. See generally id. at 615 (discussing discovery of loss under standard form
financial institution bond). In the fidelity law practice area, this case is known as
the City Savings case because, as will be further explained in Part III of this
Casebrief, plaintiff Resolution Trust Corporation was appointed as receiver to and
took legal action on behalf of City Federal Savings Bank ("City Savings"). See id. at
625. City Savings was the insured under the fidelity bond at issue when the bond
was issued in 1987. See id. at 519.
18. See id. at 630-31 (discussing discovery standard).
19. Compare id. at 627 (applying primarily objective test to ascertain time of
discovery under fidelity bond), with Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 45 F.3d at 974-75 (apply-
ing subjective standard to determine point of discovery under ambiguous discovery
provision), Cal. Union, 949 F.2d at 563-65 (employing subjective standard to deter-
mine point of loss under fidelity bond with discovery provision featuring primarily
objective standard), and Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1079 (applying subjective standard
where bond provision expressly sets forth primarily objective standard).
[Vol. 46: p. 801
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covery has occurred even before the insureds have actual knowledge of a
loss. 20 .
This Casebrief explores the Third Circuit's approach in determining
when an insured can be charged with discovery of loss under a fidelity
bond, focusing on the Third Circuit's latest ruling on the issue. Part II
examines the law governing fidelity bonds and discusses its application by
the Third Circuit as well as other United States Courts of Appeals and
United States District Courts.2 1 Part III sets forth the facts of City Savings,
analyzes the Third Circuit's plain meaning approach to the application of
the primarily objective discovery standard and discusses the practical im-
plications of the court's decision. 22 Part IV discusses the conclusions prac-
titioners might draw from the Third Circuit's decision in City Savings.2
3
II. BACKGROUND
In general, fidelity bonds come in two forms: (1) commercial crime
policies for corporations and partnerships; and (2) financial institution
bonds for banks, brokerage houses and other financial institutions.
24
20. SeeJeffrey M. Winn & Susan E. Burke, Recent Developments in Fidelity Insur-
ance, at http://www.sdma.com/images/recentdevfidinsurance.html (May, 2000)
(concluding that "fidelity policies do not require discovery of all details of a fraud
before the insured may be charged with 'discovery' of a loss").
21. For further discussion of the law governing fidelity bonds, see infra notes
24-79 and accompanying text.
22. For further discussion of the facts of and the Third Circuit's reasoning in
City Savings, see infra notes 80-152 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the conclusions drawn from City Savings, see in-
fra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
24. See Does Your Fidelity Insurance Cover All You Think It Does?, PREVENTING Bus.
FRAUD, Feb. 1999, at 1 (comparing two types of fidelity bonds). Two commenta-
tors contend that history permits drawing several practical applications of fidelity
bonds. See Norbert Wegerzyn &John Morrissey, Fidelity Insurance Policies: Yesterday,
Today and Tomorrow, in HANDLING FIDELITY BOND CLAIMS, supra note 1, at 3, 5-11
(discussing practical applications of fidelity bonds one can draw from history).
First, these commentators note the fidelity bond is rooted in surety law. See id.
at 5-8 (discussing cases in which courts have drawn similarities between surety and
fidelity bonds). A traditional surety agreement involves three parties: (1) the prin-
cipal, whose debt is the subject of the agreement; (2) the creditor, to whom the
principal owes its debt or obligation; and (3) the surety, who agrees that the princi-
pal's debt or obligation will be paid or performed and who promises to perform if
the principal does not. See Erik N. Videlock & Abbe F. Fletman, Financial Institu-
tion Bonds, in HANDLING FIDELITY, SURETY, AND FINANCIAL RISK CLAIMS 3, 5-6 (Rob-
ert F. Cushman et al. eds., 1990) (discussing traditional surety agreement). Under
the traditional fidelity bond, the employees provided security to their employers
through a bond underwritten by a surety. See id. at 6. In contrast, under the mod-
ern fidelity bond, only the surety and the financial institution are parties to the
agreement. See id.
Second, the commentators state that the fidelity bond is an indemnity policy
and not one for liability because courts will typically find that the fidelity bond
does not cover third party creditor judgments against the insured. See Wegerzyn &
Morrissey, supra, at 9 (noting that fidelity bond is not liability policy).
2001]
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Though both types of bonds offer similar coverage in different contexts,
this Casebrief focuses primarily on the financial institution bond.
25
A. The Standard Form Financial Institution Bond in General
Most banks and other financial institutions are insured under stan-
dard form financial institution bonds drafted by the Surety Association of
America ("SAA"). 26 One such commonly purchased bond is the Financial
Institution Bond, Standard Form No. 24, which offers coverage for, among
other things, losses caused by the infidelity of employees. 27 This coverage
Finally, these commentators suggest that the fidelity bond is not a contract of
adhesion because the American Bankers Association played a significant part in
the bond's drafting, and, therefore, courts should not apply the canon of contra
proferentum when interpreting the bond's language. See id. at 9-11 (discussing role
of American Bankers Association in bond's drafting process); Sharp v. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp., 858 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). The contra proferen-
turn theory of contract interpretation provides that where a term of an adhesion
contract is ambiguous, the court shall construe the term in favor of the insured
and against the insurer. See Wegerzyn & Morrissey, supra, at 16 (defining "contra
proferenturn").
25. For a discussion of commercial crime policies, see infra note 26. For a
thorough discussion of many aspects of a claim under a commercial crime policy,
see A.B.A. COMMERCIAL CRIME POLICY (GilbertJ. Schroeder ed., 1997).
26. See Andrew M. Reidy & Barbara M. Tapscott, The Pitfalls of Fidelity Insur-
ance, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1996, at B7 (stating that banks and financial institutions
purchase policies based on Standard Form No. 24). Corporations and other busi-
ness entities may also purchase similar bonds called commercial crime policies,
which offer coverage of similar risks. See Dolores A. Parr & Gail K Donovan, Back
to the Future: Proposed Fidelity Coverage for Financial Institution Bonds and Commercial
Crime Policies, 1 E-DicGTA (2000), at http://www.abanet.org/tips/edicta/do-
novanparrart.html. While the SAA has also written standard form commercial
crime policies, they have not had as wide an acceptance as the financial institution
standard form bonds. See id. (acknowledging that standard form commercial
crime bonds have not been widely adopted). Therefore, most commercial crime
policies are not standardized and vary by insurer. See id. (stating that most com-
mercial crime bonds are not standard forms).
27. See STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note 13, at Insuring Agreement (A) (ex-
tending coverage to losses resulting from employee dishonesty). Section l(g) of
the Standard Form No. 24's Conditions and Limitations defines "employee" as:
(1) an officer or other employee of the Insured, while employed in, at,
or by any of the Insured's offices or premises covered hereunder,
and a guest student pursuing studies or duties in any of said offices
or premises;
(2) an attorney retained by the Insured and an employee of such attor-
ney while either is performing legal services for the Insured;
(3) a person provided by an employment contractor to perform em-
ployee duties for the Insured under the Insured's supervision at any
of the Insured's offices or premises covered hereunder;
(4) an employee of an institution merged or consolidated with the In-
sured prior to the effective date of this bond; and
(5) each natural person, partnership or corporation authorized by the
Insured to perform services as data processor of checks or other ac-
counting records of the Insured (not including preparation or modi-
fication of computer software or programs), herein called Processor.
6
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extends to those losses only after the insured has proven four basic ele-
ments of a fidelity claim under the bond.28
First, the insured must demonstrate that it "discovered" the loss dur-
ing the bond period.29 Second, the insured is required to show that it
gave timely notice of the loss to the insurer. 30 Third, the insured must
prove that the bond did not "terminate" as to the dishonest employee
before discovery. 3 1 Finally, the insured must show that the dishonest em-
STANDARD FoRM No. 24, supra note 13, at Conditions and Limitations § I (g). Es-
sentially, determining whether an individual is an employee hinges on "whether,
and to what extent, the employer maintains control over the individual." Armen
Shahinian & Scott D. Baron, Who Is a Covered "Employee" Under the Financial Institu-
tion Bond?, in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 113, 115 (dis-
cussing element of control when determining whether individual is "employee"
under bond).
Though many people call Standard Form No. 24 a bond, it is technically an
indemnity agreement through which the insurer reimburses the insured for loss
the insured actually suffered under the contract provisions. See Videlock &
Fletman, supra note 24, at 5 (explaining why Standard Form No. 24 is indemnity
agreement and not bond). For background on the Financial Institution Bond, see
generally James L. Knoll & Linda M. Bolduan, A Brief History of the Financial Institu-
tion Bond, in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS 1 (Duncan L. Clore ed., 1995).
28. See Reidy & Tapscott, supra note 26, at B7 (stating that claim under stan-
dard form bond requires insured to prove four elements).
29. See id. (discussing discovery element). For the text of the discovery provi-
sion of Standard Form No. 24, see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
30. See Reidy & Tapscott, supra note 26, at B7 (discussing notice element).
The notice provision of Standard Form No. 24 requires the insured to provide
notice to the insurer "[a]t the earliest practicable moment, not to exceed 30 days,
after discovery of loss .... STANDARD FoRM No. 24, supra note 13, at § 5(a). For
additional discussion of the notice element, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
31. See Reidy & Tapscott, supra note 26, at B7 (discussing termination ele-
ment). The termination section of Standard Form No. 24 states that the bond
terminates:
[A]s to any Employee or any partner, officer or employee of any Proces-
sor-(a) as soon as any Insured, or any director or officer not in collusion
with such person, learns of any dishonest or fraudulent act committed by
such person at any time, whether in the employment of the Insured or
otherwise, whether or not of the type covered under Insuring Agreement
(A), against the Insured or any other person or entity, without prejudice
to the loss of any Property then in transit in the custody of such person,
or (b) 15 days after the receipt by the Insured of a written notice from the
Underwriter of its desire to cancel this bond as to such person.
Termination of the bond as to any Insured terminates liability for
any loss sustained by such Insured which is discovered after the effective
date of such termination.
STANDARD FoRM No. 24, supra note 13, § 12. The equitable rationale behind the
termination provision is that it is unfair to impose on the insurer the risk of loss
from an employee whom the insured knows or has reason to know is dishonest, yet
continues to employ. See Reidy & Tapscott, supra note 26, at B7 (discussion reason-
ing behind termination clause). For a detailed discussion of cases involving the
termination and cancellation clause of Standard Form No. 24, see David E. Bordon
et al., Conditions to Recovery: Termination and Cancellation, in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 315, 316-29.
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ployee acted with the requisite mental state, or "manifest intent," to com-
mit the fraudulent act. 32 In addition to these basic elements, the insured
will have the burden of proving that the dishonest acts of an employee
directly caused the alleged loss.
33
32. See Reidy & Tapscott, supra note 26, at B7 (discussing manifest intent ele-
ment). The manifest intent provision of Standard Form No. 24 defines manifest
intent as "dishonest or fraudulent acts committed by the employee" with the intent
"(a) to cause the Insured to sustain such loss; and (b) to obtain financial benefit
for the Employee or another person or entity." STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note
13, at Insuring Agreements § (A).
Commentators have fiercely debated the scope of the manifest intent clause.
See Mark E. Wilson, How to Prepare and Present a Fidelity Claim: Advice for the Insured,
28 THE BRIEF 54, 59 n.33 (1999) (stating that definition of manifest intent is "[t] he
single most controversial and dynamic area of law under fidelity bonds"). It is well
settled, however, that the rationale behind the manifest intent requirement is to
limit loan losses to claims in which the employee intended to defraud the em-
ployee, and not to include those in which the employee simply exercised poor
business judgment. See Michael Keeley, Employee Dishonesty Claims: Discerning the
Employees Manifest Intent, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 915, 919-20 (1995) (discussing pur-
pose behind manifest intent element).
33. See Horkovich et al., supra note 9, at 372 (explaining additional elements
insured must prove). To be clear, the standard to be used when determining
whether a loss resulted directly from a dishonest or fraudulent act of an employee
is a cause-in-fact standard, not a reasonable foresecability/proximate cause stan-
dard. See STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note 13, at Insuring Agreements § (A)
(stating that coverage extends only to losses caused directly by dishonest or fraudu-
lent acts of employees); William T. Bogaert & Andrew F. Caplan, Computing the
Amount of Compensable Loss Under the Financial Institution Bond, 33 TORT & INS. L.J.
807, 813-14 (1998) (discussing proof of actual causation under standard form fi-
nancial institution bond). For a thorough discussion of the causation element of a
claim under a fidelity bond, see Bradford R. Carver, Loss and Causation, in HAN-
DLING FIDELITY BOND CLAIMS, supra note 1, at 333.
In contrast to Horkovich's contentions, two commentators suggest that there
are instead eight slightly different issues that the insured faces when attempting to
recover for a loss under the bond's fidelity insuring agreement. These issues are:
1. Was a loss incurred by the insured?;
2. Did the loss result directly from certain acts by an Employee?;
3. Were those acts committed by an Employee?;
4. Were those acts dishonest or fraudulent?;
5. Were the acts committed with the manifest intent to cause the insured
to sustain a loss and to obtain a financial benefit for the Employee or
another?;
6. Was a financial benefit intended to be received by the Employee or
another?;
7. In connection with a loan loss claim, did the Employee act in collusion
with one or more parties to the transactions?; and
8. In connection with a loan loss claim, did the Employee receive a fi-
nancial benefit with a value of at least $2,500 in connection with the
transactions?
Harvey C. Koch & Michael Keeley, Employee Dishonesty: The Essential Elements of Cover-
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B. The Discovery of Loss Issue
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions Involving
Pre-Standard Form Bonds
For nearly half a century before the SAA drafted Standard Form No.
24 in 1941, many courts grappled with the issue of when the insured could
be charged with discovery of loss. 34 The seminal case in this pre-Standard
Form No. 24 era is the United States Supreme Court's decision in American
Surety Co. v. Pauly,35 which courts frequently cite when determining the
point of discovery.3 6 In Pauly, the discovery provision of the bond at issue
required the insured to give notice to the insurer "of any act on the part of
the employ6, which may involve a loss for which the company is responsi-
ble hereunder, as soon as practicable after the occurrence of such act shall
have come to the knowledge of the employer."3 7 In affirming the trial
court's jury instruction, the Court read the provision as employing a sub-
jective standard: the insured could be charged with discovering a loss
under the policy only once the insured had actual knowledge of some
specific fraudulent act that resulted or would result in a loss. 38 The Court
also stated that the insured cannot be charged with discovery based merely
on suspicions; instead, the insured must have knowledge of some specific
34. See Edward G. Gallagher et al., A Brief History of the Financial Institution
Bond, in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 1, 15 (noting that
SAA drafted bankers blanket bond, Standard Form No. 24 in 1941). The 1941
Standard Form No. 24, then called a bankers blanket bond, offered coverage for
loss of "property, broad forgery protection, and coverage for losses sustained by an
insured bank through payment on stolen or lost unsold travelers checks contain-
ing forged signatures." Id. at 16. The SAA renamed the bond to "financial institu-
tion bond" because of confusion over the term "blanket." See Videlock & Fletman,
supra note 24, at 5 (explaining reason for renaming of blanket bond). Some
thought it referred to the uniform monetary amount of coverage the insurer ap-
plied to each insuring agreement unless the bond noted otherwise. See id. Others
thought that it related to the fidelity provision of the bond, which covers nearly all
of the insured's employees. See id.
35. 170 U.S. 133 (1898).
36. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 151 (acknowledging that Pauly is
starting place for discussions of loss discovery and is frequently cited opinion in
such discussions).
37. Pauly, 170 U.S. at 136. The facts leading to the lawsuit in Pauly began in
1891, when an employee of the insured bank fraudulently &edited $44,500 to the
bank president's account. See id. at 138. A few months later, the bank suffered
serious financial setbacks, and Pauly was appointed its receiver. See id. An auditor
noticed possible inconsistencies in the bank's books, although Pauly was not aware
of these irregularities until the auditor finished the examination. See id. at 138-39.
Pauly then filed a claim of loss with the insurer, which denied coverage, arguing
that Pauly knew of the loss since his appointment and therefore had not given
notice "as soon as practicable." See id. at 144.
38. See id. at 145 ("[I]t was plaintiff's duty under the policy, when it came to
his knowledge, when he was satisfied that the cashier had committed acts of dis-
honesty or fraud likely to involve loss to the defendant under the bond, as soon as
was practicable thereafter to give written notice .... ").
2001] CASEBRIEF 809
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fraudulent act.39 Courts have cited Pauly consistently for this proposition,
including the Third Circuit in Fidelity &Deposit Co. v. Hudson United Bank4°)
and City Savings, which are discussed below.
4 1
Though many courts have cited Pauly when applying a strictly subjec-
tive test to determine the point of discovery, the Supreme Court may have
also added an objective element to the standard. 42 In the Pauly opinion,
the Court explained that the insured could not be charged with discovery
based on mere suspicions, but could be charged only when the insured
had knowledge of facts "as would justify a careful and prudent [person] in
charging another with fraud or dishonesty.
43
Further, in the subsequent case of Guarantee Co. of North America v.
Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co.,44 the Court appeared to draw on an
objective component-hinted at in Pauly.4 5 The bond at issue in Mechan-
ics' Savings had two notice provisions which required the insured to notify
the insurer either when the insured became aware of an employee en-
gaged in "speculation or gambling" or when the insured gained knowl-
edge of an act of an employee that might have involved a loss. 4 6 The first
provision, the Court noted, went to the insured's awareness of the act,
which was not equivalent to its knowledge of the act.47 The Court stated
that "to become aware of" was not the same in meaning as "to have knowl-
edge of," but was better understood as "'to be informed of,' or, 'to be
apprised of,' or, 'to be put on one's guard with respect to' . . . .,48
39. See id. at 146 (stating that insured had no duty to notify insurer until in-
sured had knowledge of some specific or fraudulent act).
40. 653 F.2d 766, 774 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of Hudson United, see
infra note 76 and accompanying text.
41. See City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 629 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Am. Sur. Co. v.
Pauly, 170 U.S. 133 (1898)). For a discussion of City Savings, see infra notes 80-152
and accompanying text.
42. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 152 (noting that Court appeared to
add reasonable person element to standard for ascertaining time of discovery of
loss); Devin & David, supra note 12, at 547 (explaining possible objective compo-
nent to Pauly test for determining point of discovery of loss).
43. Pauly, 170 U.S. at 147.
44. 183 U.S. 402 (1902). In Mechanics' Savings, one of the insured's employ-
ees embezzled more than $100,000, which the insured reported after gaining
knowledge of the fraud. See id. at 418. The insurer refused coverage, arguing that,
based on the employee's testimony, the insured knew before the loss that the em-
ployee was a speculator. See id. The insured, citing Pauly, countered by arguing
that it was not required to give notice until it had actual knowledge, not mere
suspicion, sufficient to support a charge of fraud on the employee. See id.
45. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 155 (stating that Court in Mechanics'
Savings employed primarily objective standard to gauge point of discovery of loss);
Devin & David, supra note 12, at 547 (asserting that Mechanics'Savings supports use
of primarily objective standard to determine time of discovery of loss).
46. See Mechs.' Say., 183 U.S. at 405, 420 (setting notice provisions).
47. See id. ("To be aware is not the same as to have knowledge. The bond
itself distinguishes between the two phrases and uses them as not synonymous with
each other.").
48. Id.
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According to two commentators, the bond's notice provisions in
Mechanics' Savings seemed to require either notice or inquiry, or both, ei-
ther when the insured gained knowledge of facts that might have led to a
loss or when it learned of facts that would have led a "careful and prudent
[person] to suspect dishonesty."49 Therefore, according to these com-
mentators, the Court likened awareness to reasonable suspicion.
5 0
Though some courts contend that Pauly provides a basis for an argument
supporting an objective component in the discovery standard, these courts
have typically produced opinions of questionable logic.5 1 Additionally,
these courts have largely overlooked Mechanics' Savings; in City Savings, the
Third Circuit overlooked Mechanics'Savings when it interpreted the discov-
ery standard of the standard form fidelity bond. 52
2. The Discovery Concept of the Standard Form Financial Institution Bond
For over half of a century after the Supreme Court decided Pauly and
Mechanics' Savings, there was no consistent definition for discovery under
fidelity bonds. 53 In 1969, however, the SAA began to clear the air when it
revised the SAA Standard Form No. 24 to include the first standard notice
requirements; but the SAA did not include a discovery standard. 54 Finally,
in 1980, the SAA added a discovery definition to the bond, which in its
modern form is embodied in the most recent revision of Standard Form
No. 24:
Discovery occurs when the Insured first becomes aware of facts
which would cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss of a
type covered by this bond has been or will be incurred, regardless
of when the act or acts causing or contributing to such loss oc-
49. Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 155. Clore and Keeley base this conclu-
sion on the Court's statement that, in reference to the facts of the case, it was
difficult to see "how [a] careful and prudent [person] could have been justified in
omitting independent inquiry" into the employee's activities. Id.
50. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 155 (concluding that Court associ-
ated awareness with reasonable suspicion).
51. See Devin & David, supra note 12, at 548 (noting illogical reliance on Pauly
by courts applying primarily objective standard).
52. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 155 (stating that courts have essen-
tially ignored Mechanics' Savings).
53. The Supreme Court decided Pauly in 1898 and Mechanics'Savings in 1902,
but not until 1969 did the SAA began standardizing the discovery test. See Devin &
David, supra note 12, at 544 n.7.
54. See id. (discussing first discovery standard). The 1969 bond simply re-
quired the insured to notify the insurer "[a]t the earliest practicable moment after
discovery of any loss .... Id. The SAA also drafted several revisions between the
periods of 1941-1951 and 1952-1969. See Knoll & Bolduan, supra note 27, at 11.
Perhaps most significant of these revisions came in 1954, in which the SAA con-
verted Standard Form No. 24 to a "Loss Discovery" form, which covered only those
losses discovered before the termination or cancellation of the bond. See id.
11
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curred, even though the exact amount or details of loss may not
then be known.55
Another standard form bond, Savings and Loan Blanket Bond, Stan-
dard Form No. 22, which was the focus of litigation in City Savings, features
a discovery standard nearly identical to that of Standard Form No. 24.56
In addition, both bonds'state that not only the insured's awareness of
facts, but also the awareness of any director or officer of the insured who is
not in collusion with the dishonest person can be considered when deter-
mining the point of discovery. 57 In other words, courts will impute to the
insured a director's or an officer's knowledge of facts that would cause a
reasonable person to conclude that a loss has occurred or that a loss may
occur.
5 8
55. STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note 13, § 3. Standard Form No. 24 also
features a second discovery definition, which states, "Discovery also occurs when
the Insured receives notice of an actual or potential claim in which it is alleged
that the Insured is liable to a third party under circumstances which, if true, would
constitute a loss under this bond." Id.
In comparison, the discovery standard set forth in the 1980 revision of the
bond states, "Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of facts which
would cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the bond has
been or will be incurred, even though the exact amount or details of loss may not
then be known." FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOND, STANDARD FORM No. 24 (revised
1980) § 5, reprinted in A.B.A. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 458.
The SAA also revised the bond between the period of 1969-1979, which dealt with,
among other things, the imprecise language of the fidelity insuring agreement and
problems associated with consequential and indirect damages. See Knoll &
Bolduan, supra note 27, at 14 (discussing revisions between years of 1969-79). As
of 1995, there have been no plans to revise Standard Form No. 24 any further. See
id. at 25-26 (noting that SAA has no plans to modify 1986 version of bond).
56. See SAVINGS AND LOAN BLANKET BOND, STANDARD FORM No. 22 § 4 (revised
1982), reprinted in FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BONDS, supra note 7, at 475 [hereinafter
"STANDARD FORM No. 22"] (providing discovery standard). A difference between
the Standard Form Nos. 22 and 24 is that the latter's discovery provision does not
feature the second discovery standard featured in Standard Form No. 24. Compare
id., with STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note 13, § 3. For the text of the second
discovery definition of Standard Form No. 24, see supra note 55.
57. See STANDARD FORM No. 24, supra note 13, § 12, (defining conditions that,
when met, will terminate coverage as to dishonest employees); STANDARD FORM
No. 22, supra note 56, § 12 (same).
58. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 162 (explaining that knowledge will
be imputed to insured). There is an exception to the general rule that knowledge
of a loss or potential loss will be imputed to the insured. Under the "adverse domi-
nation" theory, knowledge may not be imputed to the corporate policyholder
where corporate officers whose duty it is to report the loss are themselves the
wrongdoers. See Horkovich et al., supra note 9, at 371 (discussing adverse domina-
tion exception to general imputation of knowledge rule). Several commentators
note, however, that the adverse domination theory is rarely available as a valid
affirmative defense to insureds because "[i] t is a rare business in which no one is in
a position to discover and report dishonesty." David & Rockas, supra note 11, at
17; see also Wilson, supra note 32, at 57 (stating that insured can rely on doctrine of
adverse domination theory "[i]n very limited situations" when submitting allegedly
untimely loss).
[Vol. 46: p. 801
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3. Decisions of Lower Federal Courts Involving the Discovery of Loss Issue
The language of the 1986 bond's discovery standard is a primarily
objective test and does not require that the insured appreciate the signifi-
cance of any available facts before it can be charged with discovery of
loss.59 Indeed, as two commentators note, "the bond's discovery defini-
tion clearly is intended to counteract those decisions allowing insureds to
delay providing their insurers notice due to their subjective doubts about
an employee's dishonesty."60 Nonetheless, several United States courts of
appeals and United States district courts have disagreed over the issue of
whether the definition requires that, in order to be charged with discov-
ery, the insured itself must conclude that a loss has or will occur.
6 1
a. District Courts
Overwhelmingly, the United States district courts that have consid-
ered issues under the modern discovery provision have applied a primarily
objective standard.6 2 These courts have simply looked to the bond's plain
language and concluded that the insured can be charged with discovery
only when a reasonable person could conclude from the facts available to
the insured that a loss had or would occur.63 Interestingly, while there are
59. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 158 (stating that discovery standard
makes it clear that drafters intended reasonable person standard be applied).
60. Id. at 95.
61. Compare City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 630-31 (3d Cir. o0O) (applying prima-
rily objective test to ascertain time of discovery under fidelity boiid), Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Oldenberg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that reasona-
ble person standard is proper to determine point of .discovery under fidelity
bond), and First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801,
807 (8th Cir. 1993) (using primarily objective standard to gauge time of discovery),
with Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1995)
(applying subjective standard to determine point of discovery under ambiguous
discovery provision), Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d
556, 564 (9th Cir. 1991) (employing subjective standard to determine point of loss
under fidelity bond with discovery provision featuring primarily objective stan-
dard), and Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1079
(6th Cir. 1990) (applying subjective standard where bond provision expressly sets
forth primarily objective standard).
62. See generally Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11029 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 1999) (applying objective test for discovery under
standard form bond); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Underwriters of Lloyd's of
London, 3 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 1998) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Moskowitz, 946 F. Supp. 322 (D.N.J. 1996) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 928 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1996) (same); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Moskowitz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15259 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1994) (same);
Fountainebleau Cmty. Bank v. Fid. & Deposit Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3880
(E.D. La. Mar. 31, 1994) (same); First Nat'l Bank v. Lustig, 150 F.R.D. 548 (E.D.
La. 1993) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Corp., 738 F.
Supp. 1146 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), affd in part, vacated in part, 942 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir.
1991) (same); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 785 F. Supp.
867 (D. Mont. 1990) (same).
63. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11029, at *10 ("As
revealed by the express terms of the Bond, the definition and determination of
13
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many cases in which district courts have applied a primarily objective stan-
dard, there are few, if any, cases in which the courts have instead applied a
subjective standard.6 4
b. Circuit Courts That Have Applied a Subjective Standard
Three United States circuit courts have applied subjective tests under
the standard form bond, each beginning their analyses by acknowledging,
but then promptly ignoring, the definition's primarily objective lan-
guage.6 5 First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
merely offered lip service to the standard form definition. 66 Then, after
citing decisions of its sister circuits, the Fifth Circuit has held that an in-
sured can be charged with discovery of loss only once the insured appreci-
ates the significance of facts indicating that an employee has committed a
dishonest act.6 7 Second, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit began its discovery analysis by quoting the discovery standard and
proceeded to rely unconvincingly on the subjective analysis of a 1971 opin-
ion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, when
when discovery occurs is measured under an objective reasonable person stan-
dard."); Underwriters of Lloyd's of London, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (applying reasonable
person standard to determine point of discovery under standard form bond); Mos-
kowitz, 946 F. Supp. at 332 (stating that discovery occurs when reasonable person
would conclude from facts available to insured that loss has or will occur); Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 928 F. Supp. at 60 (same); Resolution Trust Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15259, at *14 ("Discovery is deemed to occur when the insured actually becomes
aware of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable person to charge another
with fraud or dishonesty."); Fountainebleau Cmty. Bank, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3880,
at *12-13 (same); Lustig, 150 F.R.D. at 550 (recognizing that standard form bond
features discovery provision based on objective standard); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. at 1162 (same); Aetna, 785 F. Supp. at 868 ("The bond clearly
provides for an objective rather than a subjective test .
64. A thorough search of WESTLAW and LEXIS in April, 2001 for cases in
which district courts have considered issues of discovery under Standard Form No.
24 and have applied a subjective test produced no results.
65. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 45 F.3d at 974 (applying subjective standard
to determine point of discovery under ambiguous discovery provision); Cal. Union,
948 F.2d at 564 (employing subjective standard to determine point of loss under a
fidelity bond with discovery provision featuring primarily objective standard);
Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1079 (applying subjective standard where bond provision ex-
pressly sets forth primarily objective standard).
66. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 45 F.3d at 974 (reading standard form bond
discovery definition as requiring that insured have appreciation of facts indicating
loss). In this case, the Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland ("F&D") sold a
standard form financial institution bond to Capital Bank & Trust Co. ("Capital").
See id. at 971. In late 1986, Capital suspected that its chief lending officer, Allie
Pogue, was issuing loans in exchange for bribes. See id. at 971-72. Capital investi-
gated and discovered several undisclosed business relationships between Pogue
and several loan customers. See id. at 972. Capital filed a notice of loss with F&D,
which refused to cover the loss, alleging that the notice of loss did not properly
indicate that certain loans were the claimed losses. See id. at 972, 974. Subse-
quently, Capital was placed in receivership as a result of these losses. See id. at 971.
67. See id. at 974 (applying discovery standard).
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stating that the discovery provision requires the insured's appreciation of
facts.6 8 Finally, in stating that the discovery standard requires the insured
to realize that a loss has occurred before being charged with discovery, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has relied on the
analysis of the Sixth Circuit, which, as explained, has looked to pre-stan-
dard form case law from the Eighth Circuit.69
c. Circuit Courts That Have Applied the Primarily Objective Standard
of the Bond
In contrast to the circuits that use a subjective discovery test, the cir-
cuits that implement a primarily objective standard simply apply the plain
language of the bond's discovery provision. 70 For example, the Eighth
Circuit has concluded, after consulting its previous decisions involving the
issue, that discovery occurs when a reasonable person could conclude a
68. See Aetna, 903 F.2d at 1079 (applying subjective standard despite primarily
objective definition in bond). In Aetna, the insured, United Southern Bank of
Nashville ("USBN") entered insolvency and was loaned $25,000,000 by Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). See id. at 1074. FDIC conditioned the loan
on USBN's replacing its management, with which USBN complied. See id. Tom
Mottern replaced C.H. Butcher, Jr., as USBN's new president. See id. Shortly
thereafter, however, USBN was placed in receivership and FDIC was appointed its
receiver. See id. FDIC then learned of several USBN loans issued by Butcher in
which Butcher received some benefit. See id. at 1076. FDIC next filed a notice of
loss with Aetna, which refused coverage, arguing, among other things, that: (1)
USBN failed to give timely notice of the Butcher losses; and (2) the bond termi-
nated immediately upon the appointment of FDIC as receiver. See id. at 1076 (dis-
cussing arguments raised by FDIC when seeking coverage and Aetna when denying
coverage).
69. See Cal. Union, 948 F.2d at 564 (applying subjective test to determine point
of discovery under standard form bond). But see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. N.H.
Ins. Co., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2372, at *20 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1992) (agreeing with
grand jury indictment that insured's employees "were aware of facts during the
term of the bond that would cause a reasonable person to assume that [insured's
employee] was committing dishonest acts"). In California Union, American Diversi-
fied Savings Bank ("ADSB") purchased fidelity coverage from National Union Fire
Insurance Company ("National Union") and certain underwriters at Lloyd's of
London ("Lloyd's"). See Cal. Union, 948 F.2d at 558. A year later in 1984, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLB") investigated ADSB for possible fraudu-
lent activity of ASDB employees. See id. In 1986, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") was appointed conservator of ADSB. See id.
FSLIC, claiming that a number of fraudulent activities took place during the FHLB
investigation, notified National Union and Lloyd's of these alleged losses. See id.
National Union denied coverage, arguing that the bond had terminated once
FSLIC became the conservator of ADSB. See id. at 559. Lloyd's also denied cover-
age, arguing that the bond period had expired before ADSB had discovered the
losses. See id. (stating that Lloyd's argued that FSLIC had not demonstrated that
ADSB discovered losses before expiration of policy).
70. See, e.g., City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 631 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying primarily
objective test to ascertain time of discovery under fidelity bond); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Oldenberg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that reasonable
person standard is proper standard under which to determine point of discovery
under fidelity bond); First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2
F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) (same).
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loss has or will occur.7 1 _ In taking a more straightforward approach, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has simply quoted
the discovery definition with no elaboration before applying it.72 These
circuits have concluded that the discovery standard of the standard form
bond is clear on its face and requires no manipulative interpretation.
7 3
d. The Third Circuit's Decisions
The Third Circuit has issued three opinions based on loss discovery
issues: one dealing with a pre-standard form bond, the second pertaining
to the pre-1986 version of the discovery provision, and the last applying
71. See First Dakota, 2 F.3d at 807 ("'Discovery' of fraud or dishonesty is
deemed to occur when the insured actually becomes aware of sufficient facts which
would lead a reasonable person to believe that an insured loss has occurred."). In
First Dakota, the president and CEO of American State Bank ("American Bank"),
William Deam and several other bank officials became involved in a fraudulent
schem e to divert company funds to Deam. See id. at 804. The scheme was complex
and involved nearly twenty-eight different corporations and entities. See id. In
1986, nearly two years later, the FDIC began investigating American Bank. See id.
Approximately one year later, the FDIC generally informed American Bank's
board of directors of Deam and the'other executive's fraudulent activities. See id.
Shortly afterwards, Deam resigned and was' replaced byJohn Lillibridge as interim
president. See id. By 1987, Lillibridge learned the extent of Deam's scheme, and
under the terms of its fidelity bond, submitted proofs of loss to American Bank's
insured, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul"). See id. Shortly
afterwards, St. Paul informed American Bank that coverage under the two Ameri-
can Bank fidelity bonds would terminate in mid-1988. See id. One year later, First
Dakota National Bank ("First Dakota"), merged with American Bank and sought
coverage of the losses. See id. at 805. St. Paul denied coverage, arguing that Ameri-
can Bank had discovered the losses in 1986 and therefore had failed to notify St.
Paul within twenty-four months after discovery. See id. at 806.
72. See Oldenberg, 34 F.3d at 1542 (quoting and applying discovery definition
from standard form financial institution bond). In Oldenberg, J. William Olden-
berg, was owner, president, and chairman of the board of both Investment Mort-
gage International, Inc. ("IMI") and Empire State West ("Empire"). See id. at 1534.
In 1983, Oldenberg became the owner of 9.99% of the stock in State Savings and
Loan Association of Salt Lake City, Utah ("State Savings"). See id. at 1535. At that
point, IMI was suffering serious financial difficulties and was near collapse. See id.
Oldenberg sought a $10,000,000 loan from State Savings for IMI, only to discover
he could not get the loan because he was the owner of State Savings. See id. To get
the loan, Oldenberg devised a plan in which he would sell a piece of real estate to
State Savings. See id. Before the State Savings board of directors approved the
deal, however, Oldenberg arranged for a transfer from State Savings to IMI, which
used the money to stay afloat. See id. The State Savings board approved the real
estate purchase, which was discovered and investigated by the FDIC and Utah state
regulators. See id. at 1536. 'In 1985, State Savings became insolvent and the FSLIC
was appointed its receiver. See id. FDIC filed notice of loss for the real estate trans-
action with American Casualty ("American"), State Savings' insurer during most of
1984. See id. American denied coverage, asserting that FDIC had not discovered
the losses during the bond period. See id. at 1542 (discussing American's argu-
ments made in its defense).
73. See Clore & Keeley, supra note 10, at 203 (stating that courts that have
applied plain language of standard have applied it correctly).
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the modern discovery provision.7 4 In the two cases decided before the
SAA drafted the modern standard, Hunt v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.75 and Fi-
delity & Deposit Co. v. Hudson United Bank,76 the Third Circuit held that the
insured had discovered a loss only once it had "sufficient knowledge of
specific dishonest acts to justify a careful and prudent person in charging
another with dishonesty or fraud."7 7 In City Savings, the Third Circuit de-
cision involving issues under the modern standard, the court applied a
primarily objective test after determining that the modern bond called for
a plain meaning reading of the discovery standard.7 8 Therefore, the
Third Circuit has consistently used a reasonable person analysis when de-
74. See Hunt v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 92 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1937), vacated, 95
F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1938) (construing discovery standard of bankers blanket bond);
see also Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Hudson United Bank, 653 F.2d 766, 774-76 (3d Cir.
1981) (applying discovery provision of pre-1986 revision of Standard Form No.
24); City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 630-31 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying modern discovery
standard).
75. 92 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1937). In Hunt, C.B. Love, president of the insured,
Penn General Casualty Company, sold securities belonging to the insured and
withdrew $17,500 from the insured's account without repaying the amount. See id.
at 76. A short time before Love engaged in these dishonest acts, he had requested
from J.V. Gosline, the insured's vice president, a $55,000 bond, which Love
planned to use toward attachment proceedings on his yacht. See id. Gosline re-
fused to issue the bond, and also advised E.J. Doyle, assistant treasurer of the in-
sured, not to issue an $11,000 bond Love had requested. See id. During an audit,
Gosline learned of Love's activities and reported the loss to the insurer, Fidelity &
Deposit Company, which refused coverage, arguing it had not been notified dur-
ing the coverage period. See id.
76. 653 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1981). In Hudson United, Hudson United Bank
("Hudson United") learned after an internal investigation that its vice president,
Robert Lee Potter, was incompetent based on Potter's sloppy loan filings and his
granting of loans to individuals of dubious backgrounds. See id. at 769. Hudson
United learned that one of the candidates, Thomas Mullens, had been arrested for
issuing bank checks and was being investigated for a $7,000,000 fraud scheme,
among other things. See id. Upon realizing Potter's incompetence, Hudson
United's president, Joseph L. Robertson, sent a letter to Fidelity & Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation ("FDIC"), outlining the facts he knew about the Mullens loans.
See id. at 770. Hudson United also informed its insurer, Employers Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance ("Employers"), of the Mullens loans. See id. Shortly afterwards, Hud-
son United learned of a series of loan scams involving Mullens and several other
banks. See id. at 770. At that point, Employers decided not to renew its fidelity
bond with Hudson United. See id. Fidelity & Deposit Co. thereafter issued a policy
effective in March 1976. See id. In November 1976, Hudson United consequently
filed proofs of loss with its insured, Fidelity & Deposit Company ("F&D"). See id. at
770-71. In January 1977, F&D notified Hudson United that it would be canceling
the bond because Hudson United had notified Employers of a potential loss
before coverage under the F&D bond had taken effect. See id. at 771. Hudson
United then sued F&D when it denied coverage and offered to return Hudson
United's premiums. See id.
77. Hudson United, 653 F.2d at 774; see also Hunt, 92 F.2d at 77 ("Reasonably
prudent [people] might differ as to when [the insured's vice president] had suffi-
cient facts to justify him in giving notice to the [insurer].").
78. See City Savings, 205 F.3d at 631 (applying reasonable person standard of
modern bond's discovery provision).
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ciding issues of discovery under fidelity bonds, the court's most recent ap-
plication of which is strongly supported by the modern bond. 79
III. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE
POINT OF DISCOVERY OF Loss UNDER THE STANDARD FORM FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION BOND IN RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. v. FIDELITY
& DEPOSIT CO.
A. Facts and Procedural Posture of City Savings
1. Facts
The City Savings case is, as the Third Circuit noted, "intensely fact-
driven." 80 Therefore, to fully appreciate the court's decision, a detailed
review of the circumstances of the case is in order.
On March 22, 1987, City Federal Savings Bank ("City Savings") pur-
chased from Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland ("F&D") the Sav-
ings and Loan Blanket Bond, Standard Form No. 22, whose bond period
expired on March 22, 1989.81 F&D named as insureds City Savings and
City Savings' wholly owned subsidiary mortgage warehouse lending opera-
tion, City Collateral and Financial Services, Inc. ("City Collateral").2
Three months later, City Savings agreed to extend a $30,000,000 ware-
house credit line to Northwest Mortgage Company. 3 During the effective
period of the credit line, several City Collateral employees, includingJohn
Hurst and Gregory DeVany, noticed defects in Northwest's collateral. 84
Neither Hurst nor DeVany reported these problems to City Savings.8 5
In May of 1988, DeVany and several other City Collateral employees
noticed other irregularities with the Northwest account, namely problems
with the list of third parties who agreed to purchase notes and mortgages
79. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's most recent decision involving the
discovery standard, see infra notes 80-152 and accompanying text.
80. City Savings, 205 F.3d at 620.
81. See id. (stating that F&D issued standard form financial institution bond to
City Savings). The bond stated that it would indemnify City Savings or its subsidi-
aries for up to $5,000,000 against losses resulting from employee dishonesty. See id.
82. See id. Typically, mortgage warehouse lenders advance money to a mort-
gage banker as collateral for mortgages on real property. See id. at 620 n.3. In
consideration, the mortgage banker gives the mortgage notes to the lender, which
acts as security for the loan. See id. Next, the mortgage banker sells the mortgage
notes to an investor and tells the lender to send the mortgage notes to that inves-
tor. See id. Once the lender exchanges the mortgage notes for cash with the inves-
tor, the mortgage banker uses the proceeds of the sale to repay the lender. See id.
83. See id. at 621. Northwest was in the business of originating residential
mortgage loans and selling them to investors, either individually or in groups. See
id.
84. See id. at 621.
85. See id. Kevin Corcoran, a City Collateral loan officer, had told Hurst and
DeVany of certain problems he experienced with Northwest's collateral before
leaving City Collateral's employment. See id. (stating that before he left, Corcoran
told Hurst and DeVany of Northwest credit line problems)
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from Northwest. 6 Again, DeVany chose not to report his findings to City
Savings.8 7 In addition, Hurst recommended that the City Savings Loan
Committee (the "Loan Committee") extend the maturity date of North-
west's credit line.88 In making his recommendation, Hurst did not dis-
close to the Loan Committee that the Northwest credit line was in
technical default at the time.
89
Around the same time as the first extension of the maturity of North-
west's credit line, Hurst and two other City Collateral Officers, Willem Rid-
der and Lyndon Merkle, learned that City Savings planned to sell City
Collateral. 90 Shortly afterwards, Hurst, Ridder and Merkle negotiated
with City Collateral for final compensation plans.9 1 In June 1988, Hurst
offered a "workout plan" to Northwest under which City Collateral would
work to cure the technical default of Northwest's credit line.9 2 A month
later, City Collateral officially identified Northwest as a problem borrower,
which DeVany, Hurst and the other employees did not mention to City
Savings. 9
3
In preparing a portion of the offering memorandum that would be
sent to City Collateral's potential buyers, Hurst, Ridder and Merkle de-
tailed problem credits and pending litigation, but did not mention that
Northwest's credit line was on a workout plan. 94 After the memorandum
was distributed to interested buyers, Hurst told City Savings that City Col-
lateral would include the Northwest account in the sale while informing
City Collateral employees that the credit line would not be included. 95
In the fall of 1988, the parent corporation of HonFed Bank
("HonFed"), a federally insured savings bank, expressed interest in buying
City Collateral. 9 6 During HonFed's negotiations with City Savings, Hurst,
Ridder and Merkle received a large portion of their compensation from
their severance packages, all while holding separate negotiations for em-
ployment with HonFed.9 7 In December 1988, Northwest's president,
Harry Movroydis, met with DeVany to discuss the Northwest credit line
and disclosed that he had been wrongly diverting the funds Northwest
owed to City Collateral in order to cover market losses Northwest had suf-
86. See id. (explaining additional problems unearthed by DeVany while deal-





91. See id. at 621-22 (discussing negotiations of City Collateral employees for
final compensation plans).
92. See id. at 621 (discussing workout plan).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 622.
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fered several months earlier. 98 Again, DeVany did not report his findings
to City Savings. 99 In the same month, HonFed bought City Collateral and
hired Hurst, Ridder and Merkle. °0 0 HonFed also decided that it would
not include the Northwest account in the deal. ""
In February 1989, City Savings learned of the serious problems involv-
ing the lending arrangement between City Collateral and Northwest.' 0 2
After some investigation, City Savings learned that Movroydis had misap-
propriated City Collateral funds when attempting to hide Northwest's mar-
keting losses. 103 In December 1989, due to numerous financial setbacks,
City Savings became insolvent, and the Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC") was appointed its receiver.' 0 4 The bond terminated once the
bankruptcy court appointed RTC as receiver. 10 5
2. Procedural Posture
Shortly after being appointed receiver of City Savings, RTC filed a
"proof of loss" with F&D, upon which F&D denied coverage. 10 6 Conse-
quently, RTC initiated suit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey, naming F&D, Ridder, Hurst, Merkle and DeVany as
defendants. 1° 7 RTC alleged that F&D breached its contract with RTC by
refusing to indemnify RTC for the Northwest loss. 10 8 In addition, RTC
sought a declaratory judgment of coverage under the bond and further
alleged that F&D violated the policy's implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by denying coverage./° 9
In response, F&D filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing,
among other things, that under the bond's discovery provision, no reason-
able jury could find that City Savings discovered the loss during the bond
period, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to RTC.' I10 The
district court granted the summaryjudgment motion and dismissed RTC's
claims against F&D with prejudice, whereupon RTC filed an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.1 1 '
98. See id. at 623.
99. See id.
100. See id at 624.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 624-25.
104. See id. at 625.
105. See STANDARD FORM No. 22, supra note 56, § 12 ("This bond shall be
deemed terminated or cancelled as an entirety ... (c) immediately upon the tak-
ing over of the Insured by a receiver or other liquidator or by State or Federal
officials .... ").




110. See id. at 625-26 (outlining F&D's arguments in its defense).
111. See id. at 626.
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B. The Third Circuit's Opinion in City Savings
In City Savings, the Third Circuit applied the plain language of the
standard form financial institution bond's discovery provision in determin-
ing that, contrary to the ruling of the district court, a reasonable jury
could have concluded that City Savings "discovered" the Northwest loss
before the bond had terminated. 112 Before digressing into the discovery
issue, the court noted that although it had addressed the general idea of
discovery of loss under a fidelity bond in Hudson United, City Savings
presented the first opportunity to examine the discovery definition of a
standard form financial institution bond. 113
The court began its analysis of the discovery issue by quoting the dis-
covery definition from section 4 of the bond.1 14 The court noted that the
date of discovery is important because it not only determines whether the
bond will cover the loss, but also activates the insured's obligation to give
notice of the potential loss to the insurer. 1 5 The court then rejected the
parties' contention that the court's discussion of discovery in Hudson
United was controlling. 1 16 Because the parties had contracted for a spe-
cific discovery provision, the court reasoned, the plain language of the
bond would shape its discussion.1 17
Next, the court stated that the discovery standard was comprised of
both objective and subjective components. 118 First, the factfinder must
identify the facts and information known by the insured during the rele-
vant period. 119 Second, the factfinder must infer, from those facts, the
conclusions that a reasonable person could draw from them.' 2 0
Although appearing that the Third Circuit would proceed in its analy-
sis by applying the controlling plain language of the bond, the court in-
112. See id. at 657 (concluding that no reasonable jury could have found for
RTC on discovery issue).
113. See id. at 629. A large portion of the Third Circuit's opinion is devoted to'
the issue of whether, under the bond, the City Savings employees had the requisite
mental state to satisfy the manifest intent requirement for coverage. See id. at 637-
54 (discussing manifest intent issue). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analy-
sis of the manifest intent issue in City Savings, see Toni Scott Reed, Employee Theft
Versus Manifest Intent: The Changing Landscape of Commercial Crime Coverage, 36 TORT
& INS. L.J. 43, 70-73 (2000). For the text of the manifest intent provision of the
standard form bond, see supra note 32. For a helpful discussion of the manifest
intent requirement, see Christopher Kirwan, Mischief or "Manifest Intent"? Looking
for Employee Dishonesty in the Uncharted World of Fiduciary Misconduct, 30 TORT & INS.
L.J. 183, 187-93 (1994).
114. See City Savings, 205 F.3d at 629-30. The discovery standard of Standard
Form No. 22 is identical to that of Standard Form No. 24. For the text of Standard
Form No. 24's discovery standard, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
115. See City Savings, 205 F.3d at 630.
116. See id. at 629, 630 n.7.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 630.
119. See id. (discussing subjective component of discovery standard).
120. See id. at 630-31 (discussing objective part of discovery test).
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stead stated that discovery under the standard form bond "does not occur
until the insured 'discovers facts showing that dishonest acts occurred and
appreciates the significance of those facts."' 2 1 The Third Circuit went oil
to state, however, that the determination of the point of discovery ulti-
mately hinges on whether a reasonable person could assume, based on the
facts available to the insured, that a loss had or would occur. 12 2 Indeed,
the court added that all the bond "requires is that the insured possess
sufficient information to lead to a reasonable assumption of a covered
loss; . . .the insured need not know 'the exact amount or details' of the
loss to be charged with discovery under [the bond's discovery
provision] ." 123
Proceeding from its discussion of the relevant law and the facts before
it, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court erred in ruling that
no reasonable jury could conclude that City Savings had discovered the
loss during the bond period. 124 The court stated that before the bond
period expired, City Savings was aware that DeVany knew about the
Movroydis scheme and therefore dishonestly concealed the scheme from
City Savings.1 25 In addition, the court noted that a reasonable jury could
conclude that because HonFed specifically excluded the Northwest ac-
count from its purchase of the City Collateral assets, it too was aware of the
Movroydis scheme. 126 The court noted that HonFed's awareness of the
Movroydis scheme was apparent because of its election to omit the North-
west account, a choice that would have been especially suspect to City Sav-
ings, considering that none of its management personnel were aware of
any problems with the Northwest credit line.' 27 From this, the court
stated, a reasonable jury could conclude that, based on the facts available
to City Savings, a reasonable person could conclude that City Savings had
incurred or would incur a covered loss.128
In further analysis of the district court's ruling, the Third Circuit criti-
cized the trial judge's isolated examination of each piece of evidence in-
stead of considering the probative value of the totality of the evidence. 12 9
In addition, the court stated that in most circumstances, determining the
point of discovery is a difficult task and is inherently fact-driven.' 30 Conse-
quently, the court added, determining on summary judgment when the
121. Id. at 631 (citations omitted).




126. See id. at 632.
127. See id. (stating that HonFed's choice to omit Northwest account from its
purchase was especially suspect).
128. See id. at 631 ("[A] reasonable jury could find that City [Savings] pos-
sessed sufficient knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonable person to as-
sume that a covered loss had or would be incurred .....
129. See id. at 632.
130. See id.
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insured had discovered a loss could be equally as difficult for a trial
court.131
C. Analysis and Practical Implications of the Third Circuit's Approach to
Discovery in City Savings
1. Analysis
The Third Circuit's reading of the modern bond's discovery provision
was correct. 132 The decision is a natural outgrowth of its pre-standard
form financial institution bond opinions and follows the holdings of sev-
eral other circuit courts and a great number of district courts. 13 3 Perhaps
more importantly, the court's interpretation of the discovery standard as
an objective test comports with the plain language of the bond's discovery
provision.13 4 Indeed, as one commentator notes, "The 'subjective' view is
impossible to reconcile with the current language of the Standard Form
24 financial institution bond."135 Unlike those circuits that have acknowl-
edged, but ultimately ignored, the primarily objective language of the dis-
covery standard, the Third Circuit and several other circuits have properly
held that the standard does not require that the insured have enough in-
131. See id.
132. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the discovery
standard, see supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Oldenberg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1542 (10th
Cir. 1994) (stating that reasonable person standard is proper to determine point of
discovery under fidelity bond); First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fid. &
Deposit Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11029, at *10 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 1999) ("As
revealed by the express terms of the Bond, the definition and determination of
when discovery occurs is measured under an objective reasonable person stan-
dard."); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Underwriters of Lloyd's of London, 3 F. Supp.
2d 120, 147 (D. Mass. 1998) (applying reasonable person standard to determine
point of discovery under standard form bond); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mosko-
witz, 946 F. Supp. 322, 332 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating that discovery occurs when rea-
sonable person could conclude from facts available to insured that loss has or will
occur); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 928 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Mass.
1996) (same); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Moskowitz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15259,
at *14 (D.NJ. Aug. 31, 1994) ("Discovery is deemed to occur when the insured
actually becomes aware of sufficient facts which would lead a reasonable person to
charge another with fraud or dishonesty."); Fountainebleau Cmty. Bank v. Fid. &
Deposit Ins. Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3880, at *12-13 (E.D. La. March 31, 1994)
(same); First Nat'l Bank v. Lustig, 150 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D. La. 1993) (recognizing
that standard form bond features discovery provision based on objective standard);
Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1146, 1162
(M.D. Tenn. 1990), affd in part, vacated in part, 942 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991)
(same); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 785 F. Supp. 867, 868
(D. Mont. 1990) ("The bond clearly provides for an objective rather than a subjec-
tive test .... ).
134. For the text of the standard form financial institution bond's discovery
provision, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
135. Wilson, supra note 32, at 56 ("The issue is more open to argument under
policies with no definition, such as standard commercial crime policies.").
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formation to charge an employee with dishonesty before it may be
charged with discovery.
13 6
The Third Circuit has found nothing unclear about the discovery
standard's language, nor has the court found it necessary to read words
into a provision for which parties have specifically contracted. 137 Rather
than ignoring the bond's language and relying on pre-standard form bond
opinions for the proposition that a subjective component is implied in the
modern bond's discovery standard as several circuits have done, the Third
Circuit has agreed with several other circuits by constraining its analysis to
the bond's four corners.' 8
2. Practical Implications
The Third Circuit's decision in City Savings produces two practical
implications. First, although the bond's discovery standard appears to be
pro-insurer in the abstract, it will, in circumstances like those in City Sav-
ings, aid a receiver in recovering for losses sustained by the then-insured
under the bond.139 In City Savings, the bond terminated immediately
when the receiver took over the insured, whereupon the insurer denied
coverage for the loss, claiming the insured did not discover the loss before
the takeover. 140 Under the Third Circuit's approach and the bond's plain
language, however, a court will look to the circumstances before a take-
over to determine if a reasonable person could conclude whether, based
136. Compare City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 630-31 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying pri-
marily objective test to ascertain time of discovery under fidelity bond), Oldenberg,
34 F.3d at 1542 (stating that reasonable person standard is proper to determine
point of discovery under fidelity bond), and First Dakota, 2 F.3d at 807 (using pri-
marily objective standard to gauge time of discovery), with Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying subjective stan-
dard to determine point of discovery under ambiguous discovery provision), Cal.
Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified Sav. Bank, 948 F.2d 556, 564 (9th Cir. 1991)
(employing subjective standard to determine point of loss under fidelity bond with
discovery provision featuring primarily objective standard), and Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying
subjective standard where bond provision expressly sets forth primarily objective
standard).
137. SeeJOHN DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 348 (3d ed. 1996) ("[A]
court reviewing a bond should look to the plain language of the bond instrument
in an effort to effectuate the intent of the parties.").
138. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.10(a) (2d ed.
1998) ("[E]ven though a court may look at all the circumstances in the process of
interpreting contract language, the language itself imposes a limit on how far the
court will go in that process.").
139. See City Savings, 205 F.3d at 631 ("Put simply, we believe that there is
more than one reasonable conclusion that could be reached based on the facts
City [Savings] learned during the crucial days just prior to the bond's
expiration.").
140. See id. at 626 (stating that F&D argued that because City Savings had not
discovered loss during bond period, RTC could not recover for losses).
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on the facts available to the insured, a loss had or would occur. 14 1 If the
court concludes that discovery did occur before the bond terminated and
also determines that the insured provided notice within the thirty-day pe-
riod prescribed by the bond, a receiver may be able to recover for the
then-insured's losses under the terminated bond. 42
Second, where there is no issue of bond termination, an insured
within the court's jurisdiction must pay close attention to the activities of
its employees if the insured does not wish to jeopardize its recovery for loss
based on its potential failure to give timely notice.' 43 Though most juris-
dictions-including Pennsylvania-require an insurer to prove it has been
prejudiced as a result of late notice, insureds will likely not want to risk
coverage of a suffered loss and consequently must be prepared to investi-
gate any suspected lOSS.' 4 4 This is because, under the bond's primarily
objective standard, an insured may be charged with discovery based on the
possible conclusions a reasonable person could draw, and therefore may
jeopardize coverage based on its failure to give timely notice, even before
there is enough evidence to formally charge an employee with fraud or
dishonesty. 1
45
Where there is no issue of termination after takeover, however, some
may argue that the Third Circuit's approach is pro-insurer and is too strin-
gent and impractical.14 6 Indeed, as two commentators note, "[i]t is some-
141. See id. at 631-32 (looking to facts before takeover to determine which
conclusions reasonable person could draw).
142. See id. at 630 (stating that time of discovery determines whether loss is
covered by bond and triggers insured's obligation to give notice).
143. See David & Rockas, supra note 11, at 17 (discussing 'consequences of
failure to give timely notice); Wilson, supra note 32, at 56 ("Failing to put the
carrier on notice when required by the bond risks losing the benefit of the insur-
ance coverage altogether, thus placing the value of the premiums already paid at
substantial risk.").
144. See, e.g., Northwood Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 79, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying Pennsylvania law and re-
quiring proof of prejudice to insurer); In re Lloyd Sec., 153 B.R. 677, 683 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (applying Pennsylvania law and stating that "where the insured provided late
notice of the potential claim, the insurance company will be relieved of its respon-
sibilities under the policy only if it can prove actual prejudice resulting from the
untimely notice"); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 1977)
(stating that insured must prove prejudice to succeed on defense of untimely
notice).
145. See STANDARD FoRM BOND No. 24, supra note 13, § 3 (providing primarily
objective standard for discovery of loss); STANDARD FoRM No. 22, supra note 56, § 4
(same).
146. See Wilson, supra note 32, at 56 (explaining how objective standard may
be impractical). In regard to the rationales underlying the two contrasting read-
ings of the discovery standard, one commentator has noted that:
The [insurer] would obviously prefer an "objective" standard, by which
the knowledge of certain facts necessarily leads to "discovery" as that term
is used in the bond. If a dispute over discovery arises, however, the in-
sured will wish to argue that the bond has a merely "subjective" standard
for discovery, by which the insured's own subjective conclusions as to the
import of the known facts (regardless of the reasonableness of those con-
25
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times difficult, at least initially, to distinguish negligence, inattention or
incompetence from employee dishonesty." 147 These commentators base
this statement on the fact that discovery is often sudden and unplanned,
and that dishonesty or fraud typically does not become apparent to the
insured until individuals within an organization volunteer information-
usually merely suspicions of wrongdoing-to their employer. 148 Moreo-
ver, these commentators contend that an insured may not initially recog-
nize the significance of this information, particularly "where no single
individual has a complete picture of events or where knowledge of wrong-
doing by subordinates has not been reported to senior management." 149
Though these commentators may have raised viable concerns, the
bond features a reasonableness test, meaning that insureds in the Third
Circuit will be held to a standard no higher than that at which they should
be monitoring employee activity. 15°' Thus, the objective standard will pro-
vide a measure of protection to insureds because their decisions will not
be measured using some extraordinary yardstick. 15 1 In addition, an objec-
tive standard serves as a stable guide at trial for determining the time of
discovery because it focuses on the trial record and not the precise mental
state of the insured at a point in the distant past. 15 2
IW. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has properly determined
that the discovery standard of the standard form financial institution bond
is primarily objective and does not require that the insured know a loss has
or will occur before the insured can be charged with a discovery of loss. 15 3
Though several circuits have ignored the standard's primarily objective
clusions) determine whether the insured "discovered" the loss on a given
date.
Id.
147. Clore & Tomaine, supra note 10, at 399.
148. See id. at 398 (discussing practical considerations when determining
point of discovery).
149. Id.
150. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person
Standard and the Subjectivity ofJudgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 298 (1997) (stating that
"[t]he normative reasonable person acts as a surrogate for society" and is con-
cerned not with how party actually acted but how society believes it should have
acted).
151. See Wegerzyn & Morrissey, supra note 24, at 9-11 (discussing role of
American Bankers Association in bond's drafting). Because the American Bankers
Association played a key role in the SAA's drafting of the primarily objective dis-
covery standard, one cannot say courts' use of a reasonable person test is in any
way unfair to financial employers. See id.; Sharp v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 858
F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
152. See DiMatteo, supra note 150, at 300 (noting that use of reasonable per-
son standard to address legal issues fulfills "[t]he need to maintain symmetry and
generality of law .... ).
153. See City Savings, 205 F.3d 615, 631 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying primarily
objective test to ascertain time of discovery under fidelity bond).
[Vol. 46: p. 801
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss4/3
2001] CASEBRIEF 827
language, the Third Circuit has honored the language of the provisions
for which parties have contracted and has refused to read any unnecessary
elements into the clearly written discovery standard.
15 4
Paul A. Briganti
154. See id. (stating that by examining facts available to insured through eyes
of reasonable person, "we remain true to the plain language of the bond").
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